• Bumblefumble@lemm.ee
    link
    fedilink
    arrow-up
    5
    arrow-down
    3
    ·
    1 month ago

    I’m not saying that he should be doing it or that it makes sense. But no, it is very clear from the decision that he would be immune. He has absolute immunity for core powers and presumed immunity for all official acts, which the court left very vague, but didn’t deny would include assassinating political opponents. The dissenting opinion made it very clear that this was the case.

    With that said, in some way you are right. If Biden did it, it would be appealed and the SC would rule that in this specific case he isn’t immune, whereas if Trump did the same, it would be appealed and they would rule that he is immune. Because the SC is corrupt and doesn’t care about precedent.

    • Maalus@lemmy.world
      link
      fedilink
      arrow-up
      2
      arrow-down
      3
      ·
      1 month ago

      The decision they made wasn’t a precedent, they allowed it as a case-by-case basis. So Biden wouldn’t be able to point to Trump and say “he did it! So it’s legal!”.

      • Bumblefumble@lemm.ee
        link
        fedilink
        arrow-up
        4
        arrow-down
        1
        ·
        1 month ago

        Under our constitutional structure of separated powers, the nature of Presidential power entitles a former President to absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions within his conclusive and preclusive constitutional authority. And he is entitled to at least presumptive immunity from prosecution for all his official acts

        • Bumblefumble@lemm.ee
          link
          fedilink
          arrow-up
          3
          arrow-down
          1
          ·
          edit-2
          1 month ago

          Just to add some more fun quotes:

          In dividing official from unofficial conduct, courts may not inquire into the President’s motives. Such a “highly intrusive” inquiry would risk exposing even the most obvious instances of official conduct to judicial examination on the mere allegation of improper purpose. Fitzgerald, 457 U. S., at 756. Nor may courts deem an action unofficial merely because it allegedly violates a generally applicable law.

          This case poses a question of lasting significance: When may a former President be prosecuted for official acts taken during his Presidency? In answering that question, unlike the political branches and the public at large, the Court cannot afford to fixate exclusively, or even primarily, on present exigencies. Enduring separation of powers principles guide our decision in this case. The President enjoys no immunity for his unofficial acts, and not everything the President does is official. The President is not above the law. But under our system of separated powers, the President may not be prosecuted for exercising his core constitutional powers, and he is entitled to at least presumptive immunity from prosecution for his official acts. That immunity applies equally to all occupants of the Oval Office.